

~~TOP SECRET~~DCI
FinalDCI TALKING POINTS
NSPG re ARMS CONTROL
7 October 1986, 2:00

An INF agreement and a Washington summit will not come automatically. But they seem to be within our reach. We shall have to be careful that an INF agreement looks out for our security concerns in Asia, for the problem of Short-Range missiles, and for verification concerns. An INF agreement will be very difficult to verify. It will require novel monitoring arrangements and they will set an important precedent for the larger problem of mobile intercontinental missiles which we will have to face in a START agreement. It would be an error to assume that our allies will applaud just any agreement. Nevertheless, you have a fair freedom of maneuver here and Gorbachev says he is ready to compromise to get an agreement...in part because he wants the arms control process to move forward to get at SDI.

We think Gorbachev will press hardest on limiting SDI. In all of Gorbachev's statements and initiatives, the emphasis has been on stopping SDI, strengthening the ABM Treaty as an obstacle to SDI. He is pressing on limiting or stopping nuclear testing, primarily to put a crimp in your missile defense efforts and strategic modernization program. He wants to increase the pressure on you and appeal to those in Congress and the public who would unilaterally limit our essential testing program.

He will have to use the appeal of nuclear reductions to get you to agree to a set of constraints that would effectively block SDI and eventually kill the program, by a so-called strengthening of the ABM Treaty, by tight limits on research, by a lengthy commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty for the purpose of deploying advanced space-based defenses, and by a total nuclear test ban.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

The Soviets have not responded to your effort to assuage their fears about SDI by arrangements for joint observation of testing and sharing the benefits of advanced defenses, under conditions of agreement to eliminate long-range ballistic missiles.

You have a good position. The political appeal of your framework, Mr. President, could be enormous if it were fully explained to the American people. This hasn't really been done sufficiently yet.

Progress in SDI is better than anyone expected. A few weeks ago in a testing we successfully tracked a missile in its boost phase and an RV in mid-course. You would find a 20-minute briefing on this before you leave for Iceland a great encouragement.

It is encouraging that the Soviets have talked about reducing offensive weapons. These offers have, however, been linked to getting us to accept limits on SDI. Still, we should take their new willingness to undertake missile reductions seriously but also insist that any reductions genuinely and verifiably reduce their strategic capabilities. For example, new missiles they have in development will carry more and more accurate warheads. Also, General Ogarkov, their leading strategic thinker, is saying that their more sophisticated conventional weapons can diminish the reliance they now place on strategic weapons. We need above all to remember that a 30-50 percent reduction in offensive missiles will not make us significantly safer. It would be a good thing. But the Soviets would still have enough to destroy our land-based missile force, our command and control, and even our country. Thus, a reduction in offensive missiles would not permit us in any way to forego missile defense. Thus, I am one of those who would think it a great mistake to facilitate the Soviet effort to stop or delay SDI if we get led into renegotiating or redefining the ABM Treaty.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Another big knot at Reykjavik is the regional security issues, especially Afghanistan. In some ways these are more urgent issues of war and peace than the arms control issues. They are currently killing and tyrannizing people. They carry the threat of escalation. While talking about "new thinking" in world affairs and suggesting a token withdrawal in Afghanistan, the Soviets continue to pour arms and subversive effort into these conflicts. Since Gorbachev came to power, Soviet military deliveries to Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola have about doubled. The common element in all of them is the Soviet effort to impose communist regimes by force. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of Soviet troops is a key issue and a vital goal. But even more basic is the Soviet goal of imposing a communist regime. If they don't give up that goal they cannot withdraw and any so-called political settlement would be a sham. If they do give up that goal, then they could withdraw and a real solution could be found. It would be a great thing if some kind of a target date, 1989--the tenth year of their invasion, could come out of Iceland.

At a minimum, the record of Reykjavik should show a clear statement of our belief that these regional conflicts arise from the Soviet effort to impose communist regimes by force, and that only by their retreating from this aim can peace be found. Further, the Soviets must be reminded time and time again that whatever progress might appear possible in arms control and other issues, it will inevitably come to naught and collapse into new tension if they keep up their policies of imposing communist regimes. Gorbachev is very unlikely to concede this point. But your making it very strongly will convince him that he cannot get around it by evasive formulations that essentially involve our accepting Soviet-sponsored communist regimes. Driving this point home to Moscow will do as much for international security as any arms control agreements.